Availability Model of a PHM-Equipped Component by Compare, Michele et al.
HAL Id: hal-01652232
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01652232
Submitted on 30 Nov 2017
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non,
émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de
recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires
publics ou privés.
Availability Model of a PHM-Equipped Component
Michele Compare, Luca Bellani, Enrico Zio
To cite this version:
Michele Compare, Luca Bellani, Enrico Zio. Availability Model of a PHM-Equipped Component.
IEEE Transactions on Reliability, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, 2017, 66 (2),
pp.487 - 501. <10.1109/TR.2017.2669400>. <hal-01652232>
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON RELIABILITY, VOL. 66, NO. 2, JUNE 2017 487
Availability Model of a PHM-Equipped Component
Michele Compare, Luca Bellani, and Enrico Zio
Abstract—A variety of prognostic and health management
(PHM) algorithms have been developed in the last years and some
metrics have been proposed to evaluate their performances. How-
ever, a general framework that allows us to quantify the benefit of
PHM depending on these metrics is still lacking. We propose a gen-
eral, time-variant, analytical model that conservatively evaluates
the increase in system availability achievable when a component
is equipped with a PHM system of known performance metrics.
The availability model builds on metrics of literature and is ap-
plicable to different contexts. A simulated case study is presented
concerning crack propagation in a mechanical component. A sim-
plified cost model is used to compare the performance of predictive
maintenance based on PHM with corrective and scheduled main-
tenance.
Index Terms—Availability, cost-benefit analysis, Monte Carlo
(MC) simulation, prognostics and health Management (PHM)
metrics.
NOMENCLATURE
Δt Time interval between two successive remaining
useful life (RUL) predictions.
λ Time window modifier, such that tλ = Tpr +
λ(Tf − Tpr); λ ∈ [0, 1].
x Integer part of x; that is, n ≤ x < n + 1, x ∈ R,
n ∈ N.
N (μ, σ2) Normal distribution with mean μ and variance σ2 .
U(a, b) Uniform distribution between a and b.
W(a, b) Weibull distribution with shape parameter a and
scale parameter b; the cumulative density function
(cdf) is FX (x) = 1− e( xa )b.
μX Mean of random variable X .
μΥλ Mean of Υλ conditional on RUL is overestimated.
μΥλ Mean of Υλ conditional on RUL is underestimated.
RA Relative accuracy overestimation, which quantifies
the percentage error of the RUL predictions, only
when the RUL is overestimated.
ra Mean of RA.
σX Standard deviation of random variable X .
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σΥλ Standard deviation of Υλ conditional on RUL is
overestimated.
σΥλ Standard deviation of Υλ conditional on RUL is
underestimated.
RA Relative accuracy underestimation, which quantifies
the percentage error of the RUL predictions, only
when the RUL is underestimated.
ra Mean of RA.
Υλ Point value summarizing the uncertainty in Rλ (e.g.,
mean, median, 10th percentile, etc.).
A(t) Component availability at time t.
Be(p) Bernoulli distribution with parameter p:X ∼ Be(p)
⇒X ∈ {0, 1} and P (X = 1) = p.
C Cost of the PHM-driven maintenance.
Ccor Cost of the corrective maintenance action.
ccor Cost of a single corrective maintenance action.
cDT Cost of component operation interruption.
cprev Cost of a single preventive maintenance action.
Csched Cost of the scheduled maintenance action.




DTD Detection time delay, Tdet − Td .
fDTD Probability density function (pdf) of DTD.
fRλ pdf of the predicted RUL at the time window indi-
cated by λ.
fTd (t) pdf of time Td .
fTf (t) pdf of failure time Tf .
fn False negatives.
fp False positives.
h ·Δt Time required to maintenance decision, if Υλ < h ·
Δt.
j ·Δt Time required to arrange predictive maintenance ac-
tivity.
MTTF Mean time to failure, i.e., E[Tf ].
N Number of maximum RUL predictions before fail-
ure.
Ncor Number of corrective maintenance actions during
the whole life-cycle of the component.
Nprev Number of predictive maintenance actions during
the whole life-cycle of the component.
PS(M) Prediction spread of metric M .
Rλ Uncertain predicted RUL at the time indicated by λ.
RA Relative accuracy.
ra Expected value of relative accuracy.
RUL∗λ Actual RUL at the time indicated by λ.
T Component time-horizon.
Td Time instant at which the system reaches the detec-
tion threshold.
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Tf Time instant at which the system reaches the failure
threshold.
Tcor Time required to perform corrective maintenance.
Tdet Actual detection time.
Tprev Time required to perform predictive maintenance.
Tpr Time of the first RUL prediction.
Ts Prediction time at which the decision to remove the
component from operation is taken.
W (t) Binary indicator variable: W (t) = 1 if the compo-
nent is working at time t, W (t) = 0, otherwise.
I. INTRODUCTION
PROGNOSTICS and health management (PHM) focuses ondetection (i.e., the recognition of a deviation from the nor-
mal operating condition), diagnostics (i.e., the characterization
of the abnormal state), and prognostics (i.e., the prediction of
the evolution of the abnormal state up to failure) [1]–[5].
PHM is very important for industry because it allows iden-
tifying problems at an early stage and timely performing the
necessary maintenance actions to anticipate failures ([6], [7]).
The estimation of the component remaining useful life (RUL)
enables setting an efficient and agile maintenance management,
capable of providing the right part to the right place at the
right time, together with the necessary resources to perform
the maintenance task. This reduces the interruption of business
operations and possible additional malfunctions introduced by
errors deriving from maintenance.
Boosted by the appealing potential of PHM for industry, a
large number of algorithms have been developed in recent years
(see [8]–[10] for overviews). PHM engineers look at the avail-
able alternative PHM solutions to find the best combination
for their problem. For this, performances must be compared to
make a decision about the best portfolio of solutions to invest
in ([11]–[13]).
A variety of performance metrics and indicators have been
introduced for detection (e.g., [2], [14], [15]), diagnostics (e.g.,
[16]), and prognostics (e.g., [10], [17]–[19]). Based on a thor-
ough survey of the literature on prediction metrics in different
engineering fields, a classification of prognostic metrics into
three main groups is proposed in [17], driven by the functional
need that the information provided by the metrics relates to the
following.
1) Algorithmic performance metrics, which look at the capa-
bility of the PHM algorithms of predicting the future evo-
lution of the component degradation. The metrics of this
class are further divided into the following four groups.
a) Accuracy-based, i.e., metrics evaluating the close-
ness between the estimated and the corresponding
true values of the RUL.
b) Precision-based, i.e., metrics evaluating the vari-
ability of the RUL estimations.
c) Robustness-based metrics, i.e., metrics related to the
ability of the algorithm to provide RUL estimations
that tolerate perturbations.
d) Trajectory-based, i.e., metrics evaluating the capa-
bility of trajectory prediction.
2) Computational metrics, which refer to the computational
burden of the PHM algorithms. These metrics are par-
ticularly important when selecting algorithms for on-
line prognostic applications, where the time to pro-
vide the estimation becomes a fundamental decision
driver.
3) Cost-benefit metrics, which are intended to trade of the
benefit gained with the prognostic capability against its
cost.
The metrics of the latter class are fundamental for companies
that have to decide about investing to purchase the necessary
instrumentation, software, and specialized knowledge to yield
benefits from PHM. Obviously, both PHM costs and benefits
are expected to depend on the algorithmic performance metrics:
roughly speaking, the stronger the detection, diagnostic, and
prognostic capabilities, the larger the benefit brought by PHM,
the larger its cost. For this, linking the cost-benefit metrics to the
algorithmic performance metrics is fundamental for conveying
investments to PHM and, thus, for the development of the PHM
technology.
In spite of its relevance, this issue has been addressed in a few
works, only. For example, return on investment has been used
as a cost-benefit metric in [19], [20], and [21], where, however,
the predicted RUL is assumed to obey a known distribution,
which is not soundly related to the algorithm performance met-
rics. Also, the decisions about when to remove the system from
operation are considered not dependent on time. Another cost-
benefit metric proposed in the PHM literature is the technical
value (TV, [15]), which depends on the performance in detec-
tion, diagnostics, and prognostics of critical failure modes and
on the costs associated with false alarms. However, TV relies on
cost terms that are difficult to estimate (e.g., the savings realized
by isolating a fault in advance) and assumes, again, constant
performance metrics, whereas, in practice, they depend on time
(e.g., the probability of a failure mode). Moreover, TV does
not fully account for the scenarios stemming from erroneous
detection, diagnosis, and prognosis.
The aim of this work is to build a general, time-dependent,
modeling framework to link a set of selected PHM algorithmic
performance metrics to the component availability, the met-
ric that enters most of the cost-benefit models used by decision
makers (DMs) to select the best option to invest in. The assump-
tion underlying this framework is that any PHM system can be
summarized by a set of parameters (i.e., performance metrics),
which are the input variables of the mathematical model that
estimates the PHM costs and benefits, accounting for the re-
lated uncertainties. This entails that we do not need to run any
PHM algorithm to estimate the component availability; rather,
we only need to know the values of its algorithmic performance
metrics, whichever the PHM system is.
It turns out that one of the main advantages of the proposed
modeling framework is that it enables estimating the system
availability also before the PHM system is developed. Indeed,
the mapping between availability and algorithmic performance
metrics can also be used to identify the PHM system design spec-
ifications, which the PHM developers have to fulfill to guarantee
the economic viability of the PHM investment.
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Fig. 1. Examples of degradation evolutions over time.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
briefly introduces the model setting. Section III considers the
impact of PHM on system availability. Section IV illustrates a
simulated case study of single crack propagation and performs
a sensitivity analysis of the availability model. Section V com-
pares the operational costs of PHM-driven maintenance and
corrective and scheduled maintenance. Section VI concludes
the paper.
II. MODEL SETTING
Consider a degrading component, which is monitored every
Δt units of time with respect to a continuous indicator variable
of the degradation state (see Fig. 1). The degradation process
is stochastic and the monitored degradation state variable is
characterized by two thresholds: the detection threshold, which
mainly depends on the characteristics of the instrumentation
used to measure the degradation variable (i.e., for values below
this threshold it is not possible to detect the degradation state),
and the failure threshold, above which the component function
is lost.
The uncertainty in the time instant Td at which the component
reaches the first threshold is described by the probability den-
sity function (pdf) fTd (t). If no action is taken, the component
continues to degrade up to failure time Tf , whose uncertainty is
described by the pdf fTf (t).
We realistically assume that detection is not perfect and, thus,
we use metrics of literature to characterize the detection perfor-
mance. In this respect, two detection metrics are widely used
in practice: false positive probability (i.e., the probability of
triggering undue alarms) and false negative probability (i.e.,
the probability of missing due alarms) ([14], [15]). An addi-
tional detection metric is the detection time delay (DTD, [2]),
which measures the interval from the time when the compo-
nent reaches the detectable degradation state and its detection.
We use this latter performance metric, motivated by a twofold
justification: on one side, DTD can be regarded as a time-
dependent false negative indicator (i.e., alarms are certainly
missing up to DTD); on the other side, the DTD values depend
on the detection algorithm settings, which can be adjusted such
that the false positive probability is negligible in the early phases
of the component life ([2]). This introduces a simplification in
the model development. To be realistic, we assume that DTD is
affected by uncertainty, which is described by the pdf fDTD(t).
In this setting, the PHM system starts to predict the RUL at
time Tpr = (Td +DTDΔt + 1)Δt, where  indicates the integer
part of its argument. The number of predictions that the PHM
system can perform before failure is N = Tf −Tp rΔt . From now
on, we assume that the system actually fails at time Tpr + NΔt,
instead of Tf ; the smaller Δt, the smaller the approximation.
Finally, notice that in the modeling framework developed in
this paper we assume, for simplicity, that the PHM-equipped
component is affected by a single failure mode. This assump-
tion prevents us from tackling the complex issue of embedding
diagnostic metrics into the availability model, and considering
all consequent scenarios that originate from decisions based on
erroneous diagnoses of the failure mode. This diagnostic issue
will be investigated in future research work.
III. AVAILABILITY MODEL OF A COMPONENT EQUIPPED WITH
A PHM SYSTEM
In this section, we build the mathematical model of the avail-
ability of a component equipped with a PHM system. The avail-
ability at time t, A(t), is defined as [22]
A(t) = P (W (t) = 1) (1)
where W (t) is the component working indicator function and
W (t) = 1 if the component is working and W (t) = 0, other-
wise. Notice that this definition is different from that used in
[23], where the probability in (1) is integrated up to t, and di-
vided by t, which gives the average availability up to t [22].
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To compute A(t) for the PHM-equipped component, we need
to link PHM metrics and maintenance decisions with the prob-
ability to remove the component from operation during its life.
As already highlighted, the benefit of the PHM system mainly
lies in that the knowledge of the predicted RUL allows timely
arranging the maintenance actions: the time required to perform
the PHM-driven preventive maintenance action, Tprev (i.e., re-
place the degraded component before failure), is smaller than
the time Tcor required to reset the system into operation upon
failure.
For generality, we define Ts as the prediction time at which
the decision to remove the component from operation is taken,
provided that the Decision Maker (DM) always removes the
component upon receiving the alarm from the PHM system.
We also assume that maintenance decisions are based on point-
wise estimations, Υλ, of the component RUL predicted at time
tλ = Tpr + λ(Tf − Tpr), λ ∈ [0, 1]. This allows applying the
developed model to both situations where the prognostic algo-
rithm gives only the point estimate of the expected RUL value
(e.g., based on similarity measures [24], on regression tech-
niques [25]–[27], etc.) and when the prognostic algorithm gives
also the uncertainty in the RUL estimation (e.g., based on par-
ticle filtering [1], [2], [12], [13]), in which case Υλ can be the
mean, median, or some percentile of the predicted RUL distri-
bution.
We assume that the PHM-equipped component is stopped
when Υλ is smaller than h ·Δt and, also, that j ·Δt time is
required to arrange its maintenance activity. Thus, the RUL
predictions are useful only if they allow us to stop the sys-
tem at least j ≤ h time intervals Δt before failure. This
modeling assumption is also beneficial for the flexibility of
the model, which can be applied to more stringent (j=h)
or relaxed (j=1) situations. Roughly speaking, if PHM sug-
gests to remove the component at Ts ≤ Tf − j ·Δt, then
W (t) = 0 ∀t ∈ [Ts + j ·Δt, Ts + j ·Δt + Tprev ]. Otherwise
(i.e., if PHM fails to trigger an alarm at all prediction times
before Tf − j ·Δt), W (t) = 0 ∀t ∈ [Tf , Tf + Tcor ].
The proposed availability model relies on the false positive
(fp) metric, which is defined as ([18])
fpλ = E[ΦPλ], ΦPλ =
{
1, if Υλ − RUL∗λ < −dthresholdλ
0, otherwise
(2)
where RUL∗λ is the actual component RUL at time tλ and
dthresholdλ is a user-defined parameter, which we set to 0, so that
fp becomes an estimator of the probability of having RUL pre-
dictions smaller than the real ones (i.e., fpλ = P (Υλ < RUL∗λ)).
To compute the probability P (Ts = tλ) to remove the com-
ponent from operation at prediction instant λ = 0, 1N , . . . ,
N−1
N ,
we divide the life cycle of the component into two different
intervals:
1) early stop region: t < Tf − h ·Δt;
2) timely stop region: Tf − h ·Δt ≤ t ≤ Tf − j ·Δt.
Before going into model details, we remind that our objective
is to build an availability model whose input parameters are the
values of the algorithm performance metrics, whichever is the
PHM system. This model can be embedded into more or less
refined cost-benefit models to either support DMs in defining the
PHM system design specifications that guarantee the economic
viability of the PHM investment, or to quantify the expected
profit of an existing PHM system of given performance metrics
(i.e., of known values of the performance). In this latter case,
the metrics values are estimated through a test campaign, as
specified in [11].
A. Early Stop Region
In the considered maintenance setting, P (Ts = tλ) =
P (Υλ < h ·Δt). Then, for the early stop region, we can write
P (Ts = tλ) = P (Υλ < h ·Δt) ≤ P (Υλ < RUL∗λ). (3)
This inequality is justified by the fact that event {Υλ < h ·Δt}
is a subset of {Υλ < RUL∗λ}; this allows conditioning the stop
probability on the occurrence of underestimated predictions
P (Ts = tλ) = P (Ts = tλ|Υλ < RUL∗λ)× fpλ. (4)
To further develop (4), we need to characterize the uncertainty
on predictions Υλ. For this, we consider the relative accuracy
metric (RAλ, [14], [17], [18]), which is a time variant index
quantifying the percentage error between the actual RUL∗λ and












RAλ is a random variable because it is a function of two de-
pendent stochastic quantities, i.e., Υλ, which represents on the
uncertainty in the PHM RUL predictions, and RUL∗λ, which
represents the uncertainty in the failure time.
For simplicity, we develop the availability model by first as-
suming that we know the actual failure times and, thus, the
value of RUL∗. Then, we remove the dependence of the PHM-
equipped component availability on RUL∗λ by integrating on all
its possible values. This is done through the Monte Carlo (MC)
procedure given in the Appendix.






















By the total probability theorem [28], the numerator on the
right hand side can be further developed as
E[|Υλ − RUL∗λ|]
= E[Υλ − RUL∗λ|Υλ ≥ RUL∗λ]× P (Υλ ≥ RUL∗λ)
+ E[RUL∗λ −Υλ|Υλ < RUL∗λ]× P (Υλ < RUL∗λ)
= E[Υλ − RUL∗λ|Υλ ≥ RUL∗λ]× (1− fpλ)
+ E[RUL∗λ −Υλ|Υλ < RUL∗λ]× fpλ
From this, it emerges that due to the modulus in the definition
of RAλ, if we used only raλ and fpλ to describe the uncertainty
on Υλ, we would get one equation encoding two variables (i.e.,
E[Υλ − RUL∗λ|Υλ ≥ RUL∗λ] and E[RUL∗λ −Υλ|Υλ < RUL∗λ])
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and, thus, we could not establish a useful link between raλ and
P (Ts = tλ|Υλ < RUL∗λ) [see (4)].
To solve this issue, we can observe that in the early stop region
the component can be stopped if the RUL is underestimated,
only. Then, we can slightly modify RAλ into RAλ by applying
the same definition in (5) only to RUL underestimations (i.e.,







, if Υλ ≤ RUL∗λ. (7)
Thus
raλ = 1−









From (8), the mean μΥλ of Υλ conditional on that the RUL is
underestimated, can be derived as raλ(N − k)Δt, where (N −
k)Δt = RUL∗λ and k = Nλ. Moreover, the standard deviation
σΥλ of Υλ conditional on that the RUL is underestimated, can
be derived from the prediction spread (PS) ([11], [13]) of RA,















Thus, σΥλ = σ2RAλ [(N − k)Δt]2 , using the known quadratic
property Var[αX] = α2Var[X], which is valid for any random
variable X (e.g., [28]) and α ∈ R.
For the sake of generality, we do not make any parametric
assumption about the distribution of Υλ conditional on that the
RUL is underestimated. Rather, we exploit the well-known one-
sided Chebyshev’s inequalities (e.g., [29]), which can be applied
to find probability upper and lower bounds of any random vari-
able that is known in terms of its first moments (i.e., mean μ
and variance σ2)








where a > 0.
To guarantee that a > 0, we distinguish the following two
cases that can occur at time tλ.
1) The expected RUL underestimate μΥλ = raλ(N − k)Δt
is larger than h ·Δt (time tλ1 in Fig. 2). In this case, we
will stop the component with probability
P (Ts = tλ|Υλ < RUL∗λ) = P (Υλ ≤ h ·Δt|Υλ < RUL∗λ)
= P (Υλ − [raλ(N − k)Δt] ≤ h ·Δt
− [raλ(N − k)Δt]|Υλ < RUL∗λ)





σ2RAλ [(N − k)Δt]2 + a2
(12)
where a = raλ(N − k)Δt− h ·Δt.
When (12) is taken as equality, it provides an estimate of
the minimum benefit achievable from a PHM system with
known prognostic metrics, as it gives the maximum stop
probability when we would not like to stop the component,
to exploit all its useful lifetime.
2) The RUL underestimate μΥλ = raλ(N − k)Δt is smaller
than h ·Δt (time tλ2 in Fig. 2). In this case, we expect to
stop the component. The probability that we will not stop
the component is
P (Ts > tλ|Υλ < RUL∗λ) = P (Υλ ≥ h ·Δt|Υλ < RUL∗λ)
= P (Υλ − [raλ(N − k)Δt] ≥ h ·Δt
− [raλ(N − k)Δt]|Υλ < RUL∗λ)
where we added the same quantity to both sides of the
inequality. This entails that
P (Υλ−μΥλ ≥a|Υλ <RUL∗λ)≤
σ2RAλ [(N−k)Δt]2
σ2RAλ [(N−k)Δt]2 + a2(13)
where a = h ·Δt− raλ(N − k)Δt.
Equation (13) gives an upper bound for the probability of
not stopping the component and, thus, a lower bound of
the stop probability. Given that in the early stop region a
missed stop is beneficial for the availability of the model,
to conservatively estimate the stop probability given an
underestimation of RUL∗, we assume that it is equal to 1.
To sum up, the bounds of the stop probability for predic-
tion times in [Tpr , Tf − hΔt), i.e., λ ∈ {0, 1N , . . . , N−h−1N }, are
[see (4)]:
1) If μΥλ = raλ(N − k)Δt > h ·Δt
P (Ts = tλ) =
σ2RAλ [(N − k)Δt]2
σ2RAλ [(N − k)Δt]2 + a2
× fpλ (14)
where a = raλ(N − k)Δt− h ·Δt.
2) Otherwise
P (Ts = tλ) = fpλ. (15)
B. Timely Stop Region
In this section, we develop the analytical model of the stop
probability for time prediction instants between Tf − h ·Δt
and Tf − j ·Δt, which then enters the availability model in
(1). The major difference with respect to the predictions before
Tf − j ·Δt lies in that in the present case the component can
be stopped even if the current RUL estimate Υλ is larger than
RUL∗, provided that Υλ ≤ h ·Δt
P (Ts = tλ) = P (Υλ ≤ h ·Δt)
= P (Υλ ≤ h ·Δt|Υλ ≤ RUL∗λ)P (Υλ ≤ RUL∗λ)
+ P (Υλ ≤ h ·Δt|Υλ > RUL∗λ)P (Υλ > RUL∗λ)
= P (Υλ ≤ h ·Δt|Υλ ≤ RUL∗λ)fpλ
+ P (Υλ ≤ h ·Δt|Υλ > RUL∗λ)(1− fpλ). (16)
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Fig. 2. Time tλ1 , μΥ λ = raλ(N − k)Δt > h ·Δt: the Chebyshev inequality (11) gives an upper bound for the stop probability. Time
tλ2 μΥ λ = raλ(N − k)Δt < h ·Δt, the Chebyshev inequality (11) gives an upper bound for the no-stop probability.
The first addendum reduces to fpλ: since we are at time instants
afterTf − h ·Δt, then RUL∗λ ≤ h ·Δt for all prediction instants
and P (Υλ ≤ h ·Δt|Υλ ≤ RUL∗λ) = 1.
Now, we need to model the second addendum, (i.e., the case
ΦPλ = 0). Proceeding similarly as before, we can define RAλ
as






, if Υλ > RUL∗λ.
The mean and standard of RAλ deviation are




















Similarly as before, μΥλ = (2− raλ)(N − k)Δt and σ2Υλ =
σ2
RAλ
[(N − k)Δt]2 ; this allows us exploiting the Chebyshev’s
inequalities to estimate the upper and lower bounds of P (Υλ ≤
h ·Δt|Υλ > RUL∗λ) as follows.
1) If at time tλ the RUL overestimate μΥλ = (2− raλ)(N −
k)Δt is smaller than h ·Δt, then, we have
P (Υλ≥h ·Δt|Υλ >RUL∗λ)=P (Υλ−[(2−raλ)(N−k)Δt]
≥ h ·Δt− [(2− raλ)(N − k)Δt]|Υλ > RUL∗λ)
where we have added the same quantity to both hands of
the inequality. This entails that







where a=h·Δt−(2− raλ)(N − k)Δt. Since P (Υλ <










We take (17) as an equality, which guarantees that we are
underestimating the benefit derived from the PHM system,
as we are underestimating the probability of triggering
alarms in the time instants where the component should
be removed from operation to avoid failures.
2) If at time tλ the mean RUL overestimate μΥλ = (2−
raλ)(N − k)Δt is larger than h ·Δt, we assume that
P (Υλ ≤ h ·Δt|Υλ > RUL∗λ) = 0. (18)
This assumption is conservative, because according to the
Chebyshev’s inequality, 0 is always smaller than the upper
bound of the stop probability.
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Fig. 3. Crack propagation process: example. (a) Behavior in the whole life cycle. (b) Zoom in the part below the detection threshold.
To sum up, from (16) the lower bound of the stop prob-
ability for prediction times in [Tf − h ·Δt, Tf − j ·Δt], i.e.,
λ ∈ {N−hN , . . . , N−jN }, reads













where a = h ·Δt− (2− raλ)(N − k)Δt.
2) Otherwise
P (Ts = tλ) = fpλ. (20)
Finally notice that for the time prediction instants in
[Tf − j ·Δt, Tf ], we assume that the component is never re-
moved and it will fail at time Tf .
To remove the dependence of A(t) from Tf and, thus, from
RUL∗, which is represented by N in all equations, it is not
possible to find out an analytical formula. Nonetheless, A(t)
can be estimated using the MC approach in the Appendix, which
integrates the results of different failure times.
IV. CASE STUDY
In this section, we apply the developed modeling framework
to a component affected by a fatigue degradation mechanism,
which is simulated according to the Paris Erdogan (PE) model
([2], [31], see Fig. 3):
1) The crack length xi reaches the first threshold, x = 1mm,
according to the following equation:
xi+1 = xi + a× eω 1i
where a = 0.003 is the growth speed parameter and
ω1i ∼ N (−0.625, 1.5) models the uncertainty in the speed
values. The uncertainty in the arrival time at x = 1 is de-
scribed by fTd (t).
2) The crack length reaches the failure threshold x =
100 mm according to the following equation:
xi+1 = xi + C × eω 2i (η√xi)n
where C = 0.005 and n = 1.3 are parameters related to
the component material properties and are determined by
experimental tests; η = 1 is a constant related to the char-
acteristics of the load and the position of the crack and
ω2i ∼ N (0, 1) is used to describe the uncertainty in the
TABLE I











interval [0, 0.25) [0.25, 0.5) [0.5, 0.75) [0.75, 1]
ra 0.75 0.8 0.85 0.9
f p 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6
P S (σ 2R A ) 0.04 0.0225 0.01 0.0025
ra 0.75 0.8 0.85 0.9
P S (σ 2
R A
) 0.04 0.0225 0.01 0.0025
(b) PHM Data
crack growth speed values. The uncertainty in the arrival
time at x = 100 is described by fTf (t).
The numerical values are taken from [2].
We assume that Tcor = χTpred , with χ > 1.
A. Availability Model: Application
In this section, we apply the availability model developed in
Section III to the case study of the component equipped with
a PHM system for the crack propagation mechanism. We use
the MC simulation [31] scheme reported in the Appendix with
stop probabilities equal to the bounds given by Chebyshev’s in-
equalities introduced earlier. As already pointed out, this allows
computing the minimum benefit achievable with a PHM system
of given characteristics and performance.
The availability performance is evaluated on a time hori-
zon corresponding to approximately 3/4 component life cycles,
whereas the maintenance policy data and PHM data are sum-
marized in Tables I a and I b, respectively.
Fig. 4 shows the values of ra, ra, fp, σRA , and σRA as a
function of λ; for simplicity, we have assumed ra = ra = ra∗
and σRA = σRA = σRA .
Fig. 5 compares the instantaneous unavailability over time
(i.e., 1−A(t)) of the PHM-equipped component with that of
a component undergoing corrective maintenance. The bars in
Fig. 5 represent the 68th two-sided confidence interval of the
MC simulation error.
From Fig. 5, it emerges that the mean unavailability in the
whole time horizon T (i.e., 1T
∫ T
0 (1−A(t))dt, [23]) of the
PHM-equipped component is significantly smaller than that of
the component with the corrective maintenance (0.1326 versus
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Fig. 4. PHM metric data for the availability model.
Fig. 5. Unavailability of the component under corrective maintenance and of the PHM-equipped maintenance, both using the developed model and assuming
normal predictions.
0.1856). The point-wise unavailability (1−A(t)) of the PHM-
equipped component oscillates less than that of the component
under corrective maintenance, and reaches a stable steady state
value much earlier. This indicates that the PHM system reduces
the variability in the population of similar components affected
by the same degradation process and equipped with the same
PHM system.
Notice that the first peak of the unavailability of the PHM-
equipped component precedes that of the component undergoing
corrective maintenance: this is due to the large value of σRA in
the early stop region, which strongly increases the probability of
triggering early alarms. The second peaks are close for the two
components: this is indicative of the PHM capability of correctly
identifying the component failure time. After the second peak,
the positions of the unavailability peaks of the component un-
der corrective maintenance follows the typical almost-periodic
behavior, with period MTTF + Tcor .
Fig. 5 also compares the point-wise unavailability curves of
the two components (equipped and not equipped with PHM) to
that obtained assuming that the uncertainty in Υλ is normally
distributed. The mean unavailability is 0.1040: the additional
information about the uncertainty distribution of the RUL pre-
dictions allows us to not use the Chebyshev’s inequalities in
(13)–(17) and, thus, to have smaller mean unavailability values.
This is due to the fact that, as already pointed out, the Cheby-
shev’s inequalities overestimate the stop probability when the
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Fig. 6. Sensitivity of unavailability to j .
prediction time is far from failure, as it can be seen from the
anticipated increase of the unavailability curve. Notice that this
result (i.e., the mean unavailability estimated when the distribu-
tion of Υλ is known is smaller than that estimated through the
Chebyshev’s inequalities) does not depend on the particular dis-
tribution of Υλ. Rather, it is due to the fact that the inequalities
are inherently upper bounds of the true probabilities of stopping
the component in the early stop region or leaving it working in
the timely stop region.
B. Availability Model Sensitivity Analysis
In this section, we perform a sensitivity analysis to investigate
how the considered PHM metrics and maintenance policy data
affect the availability of the system. To do this, we exploit the
one-at-a-time approach ([32]), i.e., we change one parameter
at a time to analyze the corresponding changes of both the
unavailability 1−A(t) and its mean, the reference setting being
that summarized in Table I a and I b.
To reduce the possible cases to be investigated, we assume
that the ra∗, fp, and σRA metrics are nondecreasing step-
wise functions in the intervals [0, 0.25), [0.25, 0.5), [0.5, 0.75),




4 − ra∗1), ra∗1 + 23 (ra∗4 − ra∗1), and ra∗4 , respectively; fp
values are fp1 , fp1 + 13 (fp4 − fp1), fp1 + 23 (fp4 − fp1),
and fp4 and those of σRA are σRA1 , σRA1 − 13 (σRA1 − σRA4 ),
σRA1 − 23 (σRA1 − σRA4 ) and σRA4 .
Fig. 6 summarizes the impact of parameter j on the com-
ponent unavailability. From the analysis of this figure, it can
be inferred that the closer the value of j to h, the larger the
component unavailability. This is justified by the fact that we
have fewer instants to take action. In particular, when j = h
(i.e., when the component can be removed from operation only
in the early stop region), the value of the mean unavailability
is much larger than the values of the other cases, as there is no
possibility to avoid failures in the timely stop region. Notice also
that the first peak does not change for the different curves: it is
related to the early stops, only, which do not depend on j. On
the contrary, the larger the value of j, the larger the second peak,
which relates to the component failures: the larger the value of
j, the larger the portion of the simulated component undergoing
failures and, thus, the wider the peak area.
Fig. 7 evaluates the impact of Δt on the component un-
availability. The worst case is represented by Δt = 1 (i.e., the
“continuously” monitored component). This is due to the fact
that our model overestimates the stop probability at time in-
stants far from failure: the smaller the Δt, the larger the number
of predictions, the larger the probability of early removing the
component from operation, which does not allow exploiting all
the useful life of the component. As it can be seen later, we need
to improve the accuracy in this region to avoid early stops.
With regards to the sensitivity to other Δt values, the mean
unavailability values for Δt = 10 and Δt = 25 are very similar
to each other, though the case with Δt = 10 is slightly better.
When Δt = 50, we can see a nonnegligible increase in the mean
unavailability; this is due to the reduction of predictions in the
timely stop area, which leads to an increase in the number of
failures, as it can be seen from the wider second peak.
Fig. 8 shows the impact of fp1 and fp4 on the component
unavailability: different figures refer to different values of fp1
and show the unavailability for different values of fp4 . Notice
that only the cases where fp4 ≥ fp1 are considered, being the
performance metrics assumed not decreasing over time.
From Fig. 8, it emerges that unavailability is more sensitive
to fp1 than fp4 : there is a progressive increase in the mean
unavailability from Fig. 8 top-left to Fig. 8 bottom-right, which
is due to the early alarms that become more frequent as fp1
increases. In fact, the value of fp1 is directly linked to the
number of early predictions after Tpr : the larger its value, the
larger the number of early alarms. This can also be seen by the
increasing value of the first peak of the point-wise unavailability
curves, which is due to false alarms, rather than failures.
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Fig. 7. Sensitivity of unavailability to Δt.
Fig. 8. Sensitivity of unavailability to fp.
The component unavailability is not sensitive to fp4 . This
result is due to the following two opposite trends arising with
increasing values of fp4 .
1) On one side, there are a smaller number of failures, which
result in a reduction of the component unavailability. This
can be seen from Table II, columns 3 and 6, which report
the total number Ncor of corrective maintenance actions
performed over the 15 000 MC trials.
2) On the other side, predictions related to the first instants
yield a larger number of early stops as fp4 increases.
In this respect, Table II, columns 4 and 8 report the to-
tal number Nprev of preventive maintenance actions per-
formed over the 15 000 MC trials: the larger fp4 , the
larger Nprev . These early stops do not allow exploiting
TABLE II
NUMBER OF FAILURES VERSUS fp VALUES
f p1 f p4 N c o r Np r e v f p1 f p4 N c o r Np r e v
0.3 0.3 8034 37 105 0.4 0.5 7756 39 726
0.3 0.4 7953 37 395 0.4 0.6 7732 40 021
0.3 0.5 7850 37 799 0.5 0.5 7642 41 456
0.3 0.6 7839 38 072 0.5 0.6 7639 41 756
0.4 0.4 7829 39 394 0.6 0.6 7449 43 491
the entire life time of the system and, thus, increase the
component unavailability.
Fig. 9 shows the impact of ra1 and ra4 on the unavailability
curves. Different figures refer to different values of ra1 and
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Fig. 9. Sensitivity of Unavailability to ra.
Fig. 10. Sensitivity of unavalability to ra4 and σRA4 . (a)Sensitivity of unavalability to σra4 , (a)Sensitivity of unavalability to σRA4
show the component unavailability for different values of ra4 ,
ra4 ≥ ra1 .
From the analysis of Fig. 9, we can conclude that the com-
ponent unavailability is not very sensitive to both ra1 and ra4 .
This is due to the relatively weak dependency of the stop proba-
bility on ra values, which directly derives from the Chebyshev’s
inequalities.
With regards to the sensitivity to ra4 , considerations similar
to those made for fp4 about the two competing phenomena can
be drawn to explain the poor sensitivity.
The sensitivity with respect to ra and σRA is summarized in
Fig. 10(a) and (b), respectively. The decision to focus only on
the last values of the two metrics is due to the consideration
that ra and σRA affect the stop probability only for time in-
stants between Tf − h ·Δt and Tf − j ·Δt. Fig. 10(a) shows
that there is little sensitivity to ra4 , because these values affect
the unavailability behavior only for few prediction times. For
the same reasons, there is little sensitivity also to σRA4 [see
Fig. 10(b)] . To appreciate a larger sensitivity to these parame-
ters, the values of j should be increased, so as to increase the
time interval in which these values enter the computation of
unavailability.
Finally, Fig. 11 shows the impact of σRA1 and σRA4 on un-
availability, the organization of the subplots being similar to that
of Figs. 8 and 9.
From the analysis of Fig. 11, it can be inferred that both
σRA1 and σRA4 have a strong impact on the mean unavailability
of the PHM-equipped component: the smaller their values, the
smaller the mean unavailability. In this respect, we can notice
that smaller values of σRA1 entail smaller values of the first peak
value, which completely disappears if σRA1 ≤ 0.1, meaning that
most early stops are prevented. Moreover, as σRA4 increases,
there is a larger stop probability in the last instants before fail-
ure, which leads the mean unavailability to decrease according
to Chebyshev’s inequalities. The very large sensitivity to σRA
allows us to conclude that the precision of the predictions is,
indeed, one of the most important driver of a PHM system, even
more than the accuracy.
V. REVERSE ENGINEERING APPROACH FOR MAINTENANCE
DECISION MAKING
To the authors’ best knowledge, there is no simple link be-
tween the metric values of a PHM system and its development
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Fig. 11. Sensitivity of Unavailability to σRA .
cost. Then, to give the DM the possibility of trading-off the ben-
efit arising from PHM against its possible initial development
costs, we propose a reverse engineering approach. That is, we
develop a cost analysis to compare the operational undiscounted
cost C of a PHM-equipped component (i.e., without considering
the initial development cost) with those of corrective and sched-
uled maintenance (i.e., Ccor and Csched ) [1]. This provides the
DM with a rough estimate of the economic benefit achievable
by PHM and, thus, gives him/her a basis to decide whether to
invest in PHM or not.
Notice that in the scheduled maintenance policy, the repair
actions are performed every 650 units of time: this corresponds
to the 10th percentile of the component failure time, which in
[1] has been proved to be the optimal maintenance interval for
the same case study considered in this paper.
To compare the operational costs of the different mainte-
nance policies, we consider the following simplified cost model
([33], [34]):
C = Ncor × ccor + Nprev × cprev + cDT × DT (21)
where ccor and cprev are the costs related to corrective and
preventive maintenance, respectively, whereas cDT represents
the cost due to component operation interruption. Maintenance
costs are set to ccor = 800, cprev = 500, and cDT = 50, in arbi-
trary units; DT =
∫ T
0 (1−A(t))dt is the total expected down-
time over the whole time horizon T , in arbitrary units; Ncor and
Nprev are the number of corrective and preventive maintenance
actions performed over the component life cycle. Obviously, in
case of corrective maintenance policy Nprev = 0.
Notice that the considered cost values are illustrative and the
operational cost model may be refined, for example, by includ-
ing possible costs for monitoring and predicting, savings due
to the possibility of properly arranging preventive maintenance,
discounting rates, etc.
The cost-benefit analysis is developed for different values of
the considered PHM metrics: ra∗, σRA (which are assumed to be
equal for both the underestimation and over-estimation cases),
and fp. In details, fp takes values in the set {0.3, 0.45, 0.6},
ra∗ in the set {0.8, 0.85, 0.9, 0.95}; σRA ranges in [0.01, 0.16]
at discrete points equally spaced by 0.015.
The remaining data are set as in the general case study pre-
sented in Section IV-A. For simplicity, ra∗, σRA are all consid-
ered constant functions of λ.
Fig. 12 shows an estimate of the operational cost C for the
PHM-driven maintenance, which is computed for each combi-
nation of the three considered metrics. These cost values are
compared with those of the scheduled and corrective mainte-
nance approaches (Csched  25600 Ccor  30690), as derived
from MC simulation.
When C < Csched , it is worthwhile considering the develop-
ment of a PHM system; on the contrary, when C ≥ Ccor , PHM
is always unfavorable. Additional information to develop more
refined analysis (e.g., a more accurate cost model and/or more
information about the PHM system to be analyzed) is required
in the in-between case (Csched ≤ C < Ccor). From Fig. 12,
it can also be seen that, as expected, the metric value which
mostly affects C is σRA : the smaller this value, the smaller the
operational cost C with PHM. When σRA ≤ 0.01, the PHM-
driven maintenance is always cheaper than the scheduled main-
tenance, whereas if σRA ≥ 0.16, PHM-driven maintenance is
always more expensive of both the scheduled and corrective
approaches, unless the other two metrics take their best values.
Moreover, when σRA ≥ 0.07 the maintenance based on PHM is
always more expensive than the scheduled one, whichever the
values of the other metrics. Although this result seems discour-
aging, we have to keep in mind that this is the least achievable
benefit derived from a PHM tool and that here we are assuming
a constant value of σRA over the whole λ, which is a quite con-
servative hypothesis as we may expect that the predictions will
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Fig. 12. Cost Analyzes as function of fp, ra, and σRA : C < Csched (best case) is indicated by “,’ ’Csched ≤ C < Ccor (medium case) by “o”, C ≥ Ccor
by ‘′∗” (worst case) .
Fig. 13. Sensitivity of C to the metrics.
be more accurate as the component approaches failure. With
respect to ra∗, the larger its value, the smaller the cost, whereas
larger fp values entail larger cost. As already pointed out in
the previous section, these results depend on the values of j, h,
and Δt, which lead the availability to be more sensitive to fp at
small values of λ.
Finally, Fig. 13 plots the operational cost C over σRA for dif-
ferent combinations of ra∗ and fp. We can notice that C ranges
in [20000, 37000], i.e., the best combination of metrics guaran-
tees a minimum achievable benefit of about 25000−2000025000 = 20%
of the value of the scheduled maintenance. From the elbow shape
of the curves in Fig. 13, we can also infer that for smaller values
of σRA , ra∗ has more impact on cost than fp, whereas as σRA
increases, improvements in the value of ra∗ are less relevant
than fp: when σRA = 0.16, all cost values that correspond to
smaller values of fp are smaller than those corresponding to
larger fp values, for any value of ra∗.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have presented a general framework to com-
pute the availability of a PHM-equipped component, which is
based on time-variant prognostic metrics proposed in the lit-
erature (fp, RA, and RA). The modeling framework proposed
500 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON RELIABILITY, VOL. 66, NO. 2, JUNE 2017
allows estimating the probability of removing the component
from operation at different time instants. To get this estimation,
we have not made any parametric assumption to characterize
the uncertainty in the predicted RUL; rather, we have exploited
the one-sided Chebyshev’s inequalities, which encode the Pre-
diction Spread of RA. These inequalities provide an estimation
of the least achievable availability benefit of a given PHM sys-
tem, as they give an upper bound of the probability of removing
the component from operation at time instants far from failure
(i.e, when stopping the component does not allow exploiting
all its useful life time) and an upper bound for the probabil-
ity of not removing the component from operation at time in-
stants near failure (i.e, when not stopping the component causes
failure).
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In the developed model, the component can be removed from
operation at all time instants except the last j < h instants: this
allows applying the model to settings in which some time is
needed to organize the preventive maintenance action, where if
the failure is predicted too late, then there is no advantage in
preventive maintenance.
The model has been applied to a simulated case study and
a sensitivity analysis has been performed to identify the per-
formance indicators which the unavailability is more sensitive
to.
A simplified cost model has finally been developed in support
to DMs, who have to decide whether to invest in PHM.
Further research work will investigate the application of the
developed availability model to real engineering situations, to
identify when PHM can really bring advantages to the industry
business.
Other possible developments concern further improvements
of the availability model, e.g., for relaxing some conservative
assumptions or approximations and encoding diagnostics.
APPENDIX
AVAILABILITY SIMULATION ALGORITHMS
The pseudocode of the algorithm for estimating the compo-
nent unavailability is as shown at the top of the previous page.
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